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 Abstract
“Solitude and the Consent of Language: Marosa di Giorgio and Emily Dickinson,” 
examines how the Uruguayan, Marosa di Giorgio, draws from Emily Dickinson’s 
poetry to imagine the mind’s solitude as a recuperation of linguistic and 
signifying freedom within the acute context of imposed consent during the 
Uruguayan dictatorship. I suggest that the question at work within both poet’s 
oeuvre has to do with how poetic form might access the tension between 
what each understood as the mind’s solitude, that is, its individual interpretive 
processes, and the pulls of communal life, which include governmental, 
juridical, narrative and pedagogical systems, as they are negotiated through 
language. In addition to being an interdisciplinary analysis that brings together 
the fields of philosophy, U.S., and Latin American letters, this paper calls 
attention to two women writers who are rarely considered together within 
literary and cultural studies.
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 Resumen
“Soledad y consentimiento del lenguaje: Marosa di Giorgio y Emily Dickinson” 
considera cómo la uruguaya, Marosa di Giorgio, coincide con la escritora 
decimonónica, Emily Dickinson, en su figuración poética de la soledad y el 
lenguaje tal como existen en tensión con los mecanismos sociales que difunden 
y estandarizan un lenguaje común y los dominios del conocimiento. Además 
de ser un análisis interdisciplinario que alude a los campos de la filosofía, y 
la historia cultural de los Estados Unidos y de las letras latinoamericanas, este 
artículo estudia la obra de dos mujeres escritoras que rara vez se consideran 
juntas dentro de los estudios literarios y culturales.
Palabras clave: Marosa di Giorgio; Emily Dickinson; soledad; consentimiento; 
John Locke; poesía.
 
Estoy en la misma casa. El viento sacude los álamos apaches y los cáñamos 
donde un día las hadas dejaron su proposición de azúcar y de sal.
Allá, en la cocina, el ama de llaves picotea las ciruelas, los capullos, las 
antiguas carnes de cerdo salvaje.
Y no hay nadie más.
Junto los lápices, los cuadernos, y los desparramo.
Lejos, se quedan las poblaciones y los príncipes. 
Estaré, siempre, en la rama natal, en el nido de los tules y la o.
—Marosa di Giorgio, “104,” Clavel y tenebrario
[I’m in the same house. The wind shakes apache poplars and hemp where 
fairies once left their gift of sugar and salt. 
Over there, in the kitchen, the housekeeper pecks at plums, buds, the old 
wild hog meats. 
And there is no one else.
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I gather the pencils, the notebooks, and scatter them.
Far away, towns and princes remain.
I will be, always, on the branch where I was born, in the nest of tulles 
and o.]1    
Marosa di Giorgio’s oeuvre depicts country homes populated by things like 
fairies, personified flora and fauna, precariously wandering children and 
adolescents, unknown languages, metamorphoses, and bestiality. As in the 
case of the poem above, di Giorgio grounds such manifold elements, that critics 
have tentatively described as neo-baroque, kitsch, and lo maravilloso negro, 
in the speaker’s constant solitude. (Achugar “Kitsch”; Echevarren; Olivera-
Williams; and Bravo). And just as di Giorgio’s oeuvre seems to circumvent facile 
categorization, the solitude within her poems always stands in opposition to 
various forces of communal belonging. In this poem, from Clavel y tenebrario 
(Carnation and Tenebrae) (1979), the poetic voice maps a “house” that includes 
what is “there” and also what is “[f]ar away.” The “I” orders and disorders 
scholastic tools that disseminate as well as standardize a common language 
and domains of knowledge. The poetic voice is alone, remote from “towns” 
and “princes,” governments, urban communities and sovereigns. This spatial 
stance is temporally intensified through “I am” and “I will always be,” and 
then centered in a diaphanous nest of tulle. Like the brain’s meters of folded 
surfaces, the nest of tulle carries the “o,” which is as much the shape of an 
egg, as a vowel sound and the word for “or” in Spanish. “[O]” recalls the 
unfurling fabric of meaning, the constant bend of this “or” that held by sound 
and language within the mind. Di Giorgio thus draws attention to physical 
solitude as well as the solitary processes of thought, or consciousness, as they 
exist with time, sound, and language vis-à-vis the ordering principals identified 
throughout the poem. 
Many critics have observed that di Giorgio’s poetry indeed manifests a 
solitary mental or “interior” realm associated with what they describe as a lack 
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of civility, an absence of moral frameworks, or a disregard for narrative and 
aesthetic conventions. Ricardo Pallares, for example, associates the subjective 
forcefulness made possible by the poet’s lyricism with the revelations of an 
unconscious mind. He writes,
There is no narrative element but an intense lyricism since everything is at the 
service of the expression of the subjectivity of the ‘I’. At the same time, poetic 
recreation elaborates a vision, an interior world that, to add, categories, and 
conventions are abolished since they give form to confused perturbations of 
the unconscious mind without an edifying or paradigmatic purpose (44).2
Similarly, Herbert Benítez Pezzolano notes that di Giorgio’s poems “push 
from the immediate, evading preambles and tunnels . . . because they lack 
calming gestures or pacts…” (54).3 Luis Bravo extends these ideas regarding 
the absence of pacts, categories and conventions, to include a lack of morality 
or ethical grounding. He writes that “[i]n the universe of Los papeles salvajes 
…nothing is impossible. There, the movement between the imaginary and the 
everyday functions in a perverse way, without moral parameters of any kind …” 
(259).4 Finally, Teresa Porzecanski suggests that the dearth of a commonly 
experienced order of things in di Giorgio’s poetry, including animals, flora and 
fauna, is indicative of Claude Levi-Strauss’ concept of the “savage mind,” that 
is not yet “cultivated,” “domesticated,” “subject to discipline, [or] a certain 
order, so as to produce particular results” (“Marosa di Giorgio” 311). However, 
what if the “results” of di Giorgio’s poetic making are found precisely in the 
tension between an idea of the speaker’s solitude and the “moral parameters,” 
“categories and conventions,” or “calming gestures or pacts,” that are 
apparently lacking?
The fact that such ordering structures would seem so conspicuously 
absent or, as in the poem above, present and actively distanced within the 
poem’s structure, suggests that di Giorgio was fully engaging them. In fact, 
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she placed these standardizing forces at the center of her oeuvre through 
spatial, temporal, and linguistic frameworks in order to challenge and 
readjust the models with which they’re engaged. Thus, the deeper question 
at work here has to do with how poetic form might access and unbind the 
strains between what di Giorgio understood as the mind’s solitude, that is, 
its individual interpretive processes, and the pulls of communal life, which 
include the conventions of moral, governmental, juridical, and pedagogical 
systems as they are negotiated through language. Furthermore, as di Giorgio 
accesses and unfastens those pulls that hold communal belonging, what forms 
of belonging, community or affiliation, if any, emerge? 
I believe that di Giorgio’s poetry emphasizes the relationship between 
solitude and our modes of communal participation through foregrounding 
what Cristanne Miller has identified as the “consent of language” in her analysis 
of Emily Dickinson’s poetry (“The Consent” 172). Di Giorgio acknowledged 
an affinity to Dickinson (1830–1886), a “soul,” she explained, “that looks 
at me and that I look back to” (413).5 However, the Anglo-American poet’s 
incisive, taut, and elliptical verses seem distant from di Giorgio’s extravagant 
poetry paragraphs, an unrestrained movement between the human and 
animal, intimate sensualities and overt sexual transgression. Nonetheless, di 
Giorgio coincides with the nineteenth-century poet in her representation of 
consciousness and language as decidedly solitary entities that, in being so, 
incite the problem of consent. The “consent of language” is how language 
gives way to constant modifications, adjustments or changes in meaning, 
from one person to another, from one moment to the next. Dickinson 
thought that individuals are not bound to consent to the communal forces 
that determine the meaning, or life, of words, but rather, that language itself 
consents to an individual’s use of it. The poet’s preoccupation with consent 
reflects her grappling with issues of gender, the primacy of her Calvinist 
upbringing that emphasized individual exegesis, and her familiarity with John 
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Locke’s foundational political philosophy regarding language and civil society. 
Indeed, I place Dickinson and di Giorgio in dialogue with one another, along 
with Locke, by focusing on what was Dickinson’s explicit and di Giorgio’s 
implicit consideration of the “consent of language.” Such an analysis helps us 
understand how di Giorgio’s radical approach to language is, ironically, as much 
bound to her sense of solitude as to her deep concern for what irrevocably 
binds us, that is, for humanity itself. 
Emily Dickinson and the Consent of Language
Miller suggests that Emily Dickinson connects the “unclear” and elliptical 
elements throughout her poetry to the physical articulation of meaning and 
“consent of language.” She explains, “The language of Dickinson’s poetry is 
elliptically compressed, disjunctive, at times ungrammatical; its reference is 
unclear; its metaphors are so densely compacted that literal components of 
meaning fade. Yet Dickinson believes that a ‘syllable’ has meaning when it is . 
. .‘made Flesh’ in an act of communication” (1). Miller derives this relationship 
from Dickinson’s “A Word made Flesh is seldom.” 
A Word made Flesh is seldom
And tremblingly partook
Nor then perhaps reported
But have I not mistook
Each one of us has tasted
With ecstasies of stealth
The very food debated
To our specific strength—
A Word that breathes distinctly
Has not the power to die
Cohesive as the Spirit
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It may expire if He—
“Made Flesh and dwelt among us”
Could condescension be
Like this consent of Language
This loved Philology. (1651)
Miller observes that Dickinson chooses the human word over God’s. “[Human 
language is twice ‘loved’ (in the adjective and, etymologically, in philo-logos) 
because it communicates with us; it consents to our manipulation, which 
in turn replenishes its meaning” (171). God’s word, the nature of which is 
“condescension,” on the other hand, does not consent to this continuous, 
uniquely human, dynamic play of language. A language of “condescension” is 
a language of terms and meanings that are centrally, univocally determined 
rather than individually sought and interpreted. Miller continues, “[a]s 
Dickinson explains in another poem, a word ‘just/ Begins to live’ when it is 
spoken” because “in the personae of her poems, Dickinson is a poet of ‘consent,’ 
of the shifting transformation rather than the authoritative establishment of 
meaning” (172). Thus, language consents to what we do to it, consents to its 
and our own instability, its and our own shifting possibilities. Most important, 
this consent does not occur between an individual and others who participate 
in language, but between an individual and language itself. 
Dickinson establishes the “consent of language” as the “shifting 
transformation… of meaning” enabled through a word’s material utterance. 
She thus opens a possibility to how we might think about the relationship 
between language and consciousness. Consider the dynamic between speech 
and silence developed in “A word is dead.”
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A word is dead
When it is said,
Some say.
I say it just
Begins to live
That day. (1212)
The word “Begins to live” when spoken by “I,” when the physical gestures 
of mouth and lungs coordinate to emit that word from the body. In the first 
stanza, according to “Some,” the implied silence, or life of the word, would 
suggest that the word’s ideal place is within the realm of immaterial thoughts 
as opposed to that of material speech. Thus, Dickinson engages the question 
of thought as it exists to oneself versus language as it exists among others. 
Here, when the word is uttered, it gains its individualized vitality. She then 
sets this question against time. The circumstances of “Begins to live” are 
determined by the distinctive meaning, or how the speaker uses that word, 
“that” continuously particular “day.” The word’s meaning is as much released 
from any communal approval as it is released from any temporal demands. 
Individual meaning is not precluded by the past or future, but free from both. 
Conversely, the word is “dead” when uttered by “Some,” when it is collectively 
determined and held through time from the past and into the future. Dickinson 
delineates meaning through language as highly individualized, visceral, and 
unbound from the future and past. She achieves this by focusing on the 
moment at which a word “just / Begins to live,” the moment of consent, or 
hinge, between consciousness and the communal.
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Consent and Humanity
“Consent” is the permission for something to happen or agreement to do 
something. The Latin derivation of “consent,” consentire, from con (“with”) and 
sentire (“feeling”), as well as the derivation of “permission,” permittere, from 
per (“through”) and mittere, (“send” or “let go”), teaches us more palpably 
that “consent” means that what is said or done is said or done through or with 
feeling. Thus, consent is a pathway, the “with” and the “through” between 
what is “said or done” and an interior experience of “feeling” to which we will 
add “thinking” or consciousness. By its very definition consent unleashes a 
fundamental problem of language itself, that is, the problem of how a person’s 
feelings and thoughts—what is “sent” or “let go”— exist with and through 
language into the future—“something to happen” and “to do something.”
 The paradigm of consent that is integral to both Anglo and Latin 
American concepts of natural law and nations, independence, and civil society 
is largely derived from the philosophical and political theories of John Locke 
(1632–1704).6 Locke’s understanding of how consent is bound to things like 
consciousness, government, progress, time, language and, most important, 
how we define humanity, helps us address the deep language structures at play 
in Dickinson’s and di Giorgio’s poetries. The seventeenth-century founder of 
British empiricism, like Dickinson, imagines two types of consent—express and 
tacit— as “Earthly,” as natural to “man” and the ways in which he is “naturally 
free” (Second Treatise 219–220). Express and tacit consent are the explicit and 
implicit contracts, or contingencies, that fasten individuals to social, political, 
juridical, and economic systems. While Locke believed that express consent 
appears to occur clearly, for example, in the signing of a lease, tacit consent 
is a problem of practice, of everyday activities and everyday language. He 
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viewed these forms of consent as highly unstable yet powerful dynamics 
that fix us interminably within multiple networks outside of and temporally 
beyond ourselves—“to him and his Heirs forever.” Said or done “freely,” Locke 
deemed consent the most binding force of any civil society as it connects us 
to a compelling web of relationships that “reaches as far as to the very being 
[and beyond] of any one” (Second Treatise 219–220).
Language, Locke believed, like tacit consent, is the “common conduit” and 
the “great bond that holds society together.”7 It is the highway through which 
all of these networks of meaning and power are negotiated. Although Locke 
had liberated the sign from a necessary relationship to a fixed referent, such 
as an “original meaning,” he links the authoritative meaning of a word through 
tacit consent to the collective and “familiar use of words” through time (Essay 
178; III.ii.1). Therefore, while on the one hand, Locke conceived of language as 
uniquely human and individualized, on the other hand, it is only so in order for 
us to progress together from “one generation to another” (Essay 215; III.xi.1). 
This temporal element results in the idea that a communal valuation of an 
individual’s humanity—her or his actual humanness—lies in that individual’s 
ability to publicly convey the unity of her memories and the activities of her 
thoughts through time. This means that how we speak and how that language 
is communally understood or not understood is privileged over how or what 
we are actually thinking and the ever-changing processes of those thoughts. In 
this way, a disconcerting turn occurred in Locke’s logic when that “mental life” 
as speech becomes the defining factor of the individual’s humanity (Aarsleff 
271).8 As Charles Taylor has observed, the “primal expressions of human life” 
are not found in the physical substance of the body, for example, but in the 
immaterial activities of consciousness as they are spoken and, more important, 
as they are communally perceived. A person’s humanity hinges upon a socially 
recognizable ability, her ability to think and express, through a consensually 
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established language, the supposed unity of her mind.9
This is the quandary that both Dickinson and di Giorgio negotiate in their 
respective poetries. If a word, as Dickinson suggests, “Begins to live” when it is 
unbound from an original meaning in addition to social recognition, unbound 
from the past and future, what happens to Locke’s idea of humanity? Both 
poets snip away at the implicit contingencies of his elaborate web. Thus, what 
both Dickinson and, as I will explain, di Giorgio, put forth is nothing less than 
a definition of how we evaluate the fundamental, binding language structures 
of human relationships in as much as these structures define us as human. The 
moment and processes through which we coordinate sound through breath, 
lips, jaw, tongue, and larynx, are as important to Dickinson as the word that 
is actually said, the meaning conveyed, the thoughts thought. Furthermore, 
whether that physical and temporally specific articulation is socially recognized 
is secondary to Dickinson, rather than primary. The particularities of individual 
thought equal the particularities of body and time. A communal language 
and a collective future are not privileged over the multifarious possibilities 
of a present meaning. In fact, to be public in language is to deform thought, 
meaning, sound and an individual’s identity itself, as in the poem “I’m Nobody! 
Who are you?”:
I’m Nobody! Who are you? 
Are you—Nobody—too? 
Then there’s a pair of us!
Don’t tell! they’d advertise—you know!
How dreary—to be—Somebody!
How public—like a Frog—
To tell your name—the livelong June—
To an admiring Bog! (288) 
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What Miller identifies as the unclear and elliptical elements of Dickinson’s 
poetry are here again linked directly to the issue of public utterance. Terms 
are not clarified, delineated, or established as they are placed in contrast, but 
unbound, even made immense, terrifying and vast, in their indefiniteness. We 
are led more toward what words do not mean than to what they do mean. 
“Nobody” risks being made more public (“they’d advertise”) if discovered, 
while “Somebody’s” mouth is disfigured by the very sound he utters, which 
is his own name. He is metamorphosed in his condemnation to repeat a 
meaningless, formless grunt “like a Frog” the “livelong June.” The “Bog” is the 
distorted, gazing mouth, sound and ears of communal recognition. To speak 
publicly, to heed to a “Bog’s” confirmation, is for a person to deform the name 
by which he is called forever. Thus, to be human, for Dickinson, is to speak as 
“Nobody,” regardless of others and regardless of the future.
Marosa di Giorgio, Sound and Solitude 
Marosa di Giorgio would also focus on individualized meaning as contingent 
upon solitude, the physical articulation of words, and a release from the 
future. Like Dickinson, this would be her model for the “consent of language,” 
which is, again, the shifting transformation, as opposed to the authoritative or 
communal, establishment of meaning. Indeed, the relationship between the 
mind’s individual work in language and the forces that strive to systematize 
such work through explicit and implicit forms of consent constitutes one of 
the foundational energies of di Giorgio’s oeuvre, particularly during Uruguay’s 
military dictatorship from 1973 to 1985. Di Giorgio, who lived from 1932 to 
2004, published a significant portion of her oeuvre during this period: La guerra 
de los huertos (1971), Está en llamas el jardín natal (1971), Clavel y tenebrario 
(1979) and La liebre de marzo (1981). In this essay I consider the second and 
third books of this group published in di Giorgio’s collected works, Los papeles 
salvajes (The Savage Papers) in 2000.
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Throughout the 1970s and ’80s, Uruguay, like much of Latin America, 
lived under a climate of terror and institutionalized violence enforced through 
imprisonment, torture and persecution while thousands were disappeared.10 
The government embarked upon a multi-front effort to circumscribe and 
regulate every mode of communal participation and effort at meaning within 
the highly restricted military state. Those involved or associated with militant as 
well as non-militant left-wing organizations, in addition to many who worked 
in cultural fields, such as journalism, theatre, education and psychology, were 
particularly targeted.11 Individuals who were not imprisoned or disappeared 
suffered under the pressures of censorship, constant surveillance and the junta’s 
methodical privation of freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, liberties, 
and civil rights. However, Mauricio Rosencof (1933–), a political activist, poet, 
and playwright explains that as early as 1966 there were “political prisoners, 
and ‘extraofficially,’ the governments headed by Pacheco and his successor, 
Juan María Bordaberry, were dictatorial in nature. Pacheco governed by 
decree, established a ‘death squad,’ closed newspapers, censored songs, and 
killed students. By 1972 Uruguayan prisons and barracks were filled to capacity. 
Torture, rape and death were the order of the day even before the coup of 
February 9 (1973). This remained the state of affairs until March 1984” (120–
122). Thus, during the years leading up to and throughout the dictatorship, 
intellectuals were interpreting what Teresa Porzecanski has called “a reality 
under siege” (“Fiction and Friction” 216). Writers were forced to contend with 
the regime’s official discourse that “emblematically eluded any semblance 
of truth” and imposed a “world . . . described consensually” (“Fiction and 
Friction” 216). Works such as Idea Vilariño’s (1920–2009) Pobre mundo (1966), 
Cristina Perri Rossi’s (1941–) Evohé (1971) and Amanda Berenguer’s (1921–2010) 
Materia Prima (1966), question what types of language might undermine such 
an imposed consensus at the same time that they maintain a certain political 
efficacy. Consider, for example, Berenguer’s “Comunicado”:
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Malas palabras obscenas locas
lunfardas bárbaras otras
que puedan con esto:
descuartizada la forma
valgan las tripas
a cambio de la apariencia.
Lo que se quiere decir
no se dice, se hace. (33)
[Bad words obscene insane
lunfardic barbaric others
that can handle this:
form dismembered
let the entrails count 
for what is seen.
What you want to say 
you don’t say, you do.]
Words, like bodies, that have been dismembered or quartered through torture, 
speak for themselves. For Berenguer it seems that only peripheral, broken, 
exposed and even gutted forms might be politically viable. Mario Benedetti 
(1920–2009) and Hugo Achugar (1944–) identify a crisis in the ability to produce 
meaning due to the suppression or destruction of sound itself. Benedetti’s “De 
lo prohibido” (“On the Prohibited”) from Cotidianas: 1978–1979, lists a range of 
forbidden cultural markers, types of people, groups, emotions, and language 
as well as any oral or corporeal utterance. 
Prohibidos los silencios y los gritos unánimes 
las minifaldas y los sindicatos
artigas y gardel
la oreja en radio habana
el pelo largo la condena corta
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josé pedro varela y la vía lactea
la corrupción venial el pantalón vaquero
los perros vagos y los vagabundos
también los abogados defensores
que sobrevivan a sus defendidos
y los pocos fiscales con principio de angustia 
prohibida sin perdón la ineficacia
todo ha de ser eficaz como un cepo
prohibida la lealtad y sobre todo la tristeza 
esa que va de sol a sol
y claro la inquietante primavera
prohibidas las reuniones 
de más de una persona
excepto las del lecho conyugal
siempre y cuando hayan sido
previa y debidamente autorizadas
prohibidos el murmullo de las tripas
el padrenuestro y la internacional
el bajo costo de la vida y la muerte
las palabritas y las palabrotas
los estruendos molestos el jilguero los zurdos
los anticonceptivos pero quién va a nacer. (111–112)
[Prohibited: unanimous silences and screams
miniskirts and unions
artigas and gardel
an ear to radio havana
long hair condemned short
josé pedro varela and the milky way
venial corruption and jeans
lazy dogs and vagabonds
also defense attorneys
that outlive the people they defend
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and the handful of prosecutors with the onset of anguish
prohibited without pardon: inefficiency 
everything must be efficient like the stocks
prohibited: loyalty and above all sadness
the kind that goes from sun to sun
and of course the disconcerting spring
prohibited: meetings
of more than one person
except in the conjugal bed
when and only when it has been
previously and duly authorized
prohibited: intestinal murmurs
the our father and internationals
the low cost of living and death
good words and bad words 
bothersome racket the goldfinch lefties
contraceptives but how could anyone be born.]
And here is Achugar’s poem from Textos para decir María (1976): 
Lento Uruguay rico en praderas
con cenizo fonema
calzo mi lengua y te nombro:
tu carne no se levanta. (22)
[Slow Uruguay rich in prairies
with ashen phonemes
I shoe my tongue and name you:
but your flesh is not roused.]
For Achugar, the naming of Uruguay through prosopopoeia and “ashen 
phonemes” reveals ineffectual poetic techniques and, indeed, a dead language. 
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This state of language and poetic form in turn reflects Uruguay itself, a country 
whose “flesh is not roused,” that is, a dead country. Benedetti and Achugar 
establish the materiality of language, which includes the tongue as well as 
phonemes, screams as well as a hungry, murmuring stomach, as the ground 
zero of meaning. Indeed, for these poets, the condition of such a language 
that speaks directly to a communal reality constitutes nothing less than the 
condition of possibility for human life. “[B]ut how,” writes Benedetti above, 
“could anyone be born.”
Di Giorgio, on the other hand, never questions the efficacy of language 
or its political viability, because she deems language an experience of solitude 
and, in being so, is first one’s own. Consider, for example, poem “21” from 
Clavel y tenebrario:
Existe un hermosísimo idioma, cuyas palabras parecen casitas hechas con 
hongos. A su lado, palidecen las más bellas letras rúnicas.
Lo descubrí una tarde, y, no, lejos: aquí, nomás, mientras avanzaba entre 
las boticas de los eucaliptos, a la hora en que las paredes se colman de estrellas, 
y desde los árboles y el cielo, caen pastillas y perlas, vi el idioma, y lo entendí, 
enseguida, como si siempre, hubiera sido el mío. (Clavel 189)
[An exquisite language exists, and its words look like small houses made with 
mushrooms. Beside them, the most beautiful runic letters pale.
I discovered it one afternoon, and, not, far: right here, as I walked among 
the eucalyptus pharmacies, when walls are filled with stars, and pellets and 
pearls fall from the trees and sky, I saw the language, and understood it, right 
away, as if it had always, been my language.]
The “exquisite language,” like the “nest of tulle” in poem “104,” contrasts the 
cultivated domain of runic letters, like “notebooks” and “pencils.” The speaker 
has discovered a language that is already understood and proper to her—“it had 
always, been my language.” That is, language consents to the individual’s use 
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of it. However, between the identification of its existence and the expression 
of the speaker’s ownership, the poetic voice delights in the process of what 
would seem an unintended and unexpected discovering. Even though we’re 
presented with a brief list of natural elements, the effect is slightly dizzying 
as we’re drawn by a certain familiarity of the image and then unsettled by 
it. Mushrooms, eucalyptus trees, stars and sky are all common things among 
nature. However, a language of runic letters, pellets, pharmacies, and pearls 
here are not common natural elements. The list, more than describe the 
details of a particular landscape, takes pleasure in it and, more important, the 
“exquisite language” is contingent upon this pleasure.
Roland Barthes would call di Giorgio’s poem a “text of bliss.” Barthes 
suggests that such a text “imposes a state of loss” as it “discomforts (perhaps 
to the point of a certain boredom), unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, 
psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories, 
brings to a crisis his relation with language” (14). In the poem above, even 
though the “exquisite language exists” in the present, it had not been 
accessible or commonly known. The poetic voice then retrieves that language 
as it, nonetheless, remained in its original, not commonly known state. Thus, 
the pleasure of the recuperation of this language inevitably involves loss. 
We’re led from the present tense to a nostalgic imperfect tense (in Spanish), 
to the past perfect subjunctive, “had always, been.” While the shift in tenses 
might suggest an ahistorical experience, what the preterit, “discovered,” and 
“right here” trigger is an unsettling relationship between the poem’s pleasure 
and an historical indexing. Through the folding back and over of these tenses, 
as in Dickinson’s “A word is dead,” di Giorgio unbinds that “exquisite language” 
from any future contingencies. The delicate bliss of her texts signals a language 
of one’s own that, in this case, as Barthes suggests, unexpectedly “brings to 
a crisis” the reader’s relation with the implicit contracts of Locke’s temporal 
tethers (14). Here there is certainly no “progress together.” Dickinson’s texts 
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also manifest this “bliss” in their focus on the present, their attention to the 
minute details of nature, their irregular punctuation and apparently simple 
rhymes that, simultaneously, reveal sharp social critique or extraordinary 
philosophical and theological insight. While di Giorgio seems dislodged from 
any social or political denunciation, she is in fact renegotiating a sense of 
individual ownership and vitality regarding the conditions of language within 
a society in which those conditions have been besieged.
Similarly, in poem “19,” di Giorgio intersects the senses of pleasure and 
loss with the spontaneous recitation of memorized “lines” among “cedar and 
carob trees.” However, the speaker emphasizes that these recitations do not 
require the public’s recognition or participation: 
Hacíamos representaciones en los jardines, a la caída de la tarde, junto a los 
cedros y las algarrobas; la obra era improvisada, ahí mismo, y yo, siempre, tenía 
miedo de perder la letra, aunque, nunca, ocurrió tal cosa. Íbamos, de aquí para 
allá, entre los cedros y los naranjos, y acudían a espiarnos, a escucharnos, los 
habitantes de todas las casonas vecinas.
También, teníamos algunos animales en el elenco; habían aprendido a 
moverse en un escenario, a vestirse, a calzarse, y hasta decían algunas palabras. 
Desde los doce a los veinte años, representé en todos los jardines.
Pero, después, todo se deshizo.
Y los animales volvieron al bosque a continuar su vida silenciosa. 
(Clavel 188–189)
[We recited in the gardens, at sunset, near the cedar and carob trees; the show 
was improvised, right there, and I, always, feared forgetting my lines, even 
though, never, such a thing occurred. We would move, from here to there, 
between the cedars and orange trees, and they would come to spy on us, to 
listen to us, the inhabitants of all the neighboring country houses.
We would include some animals in the cast as well; they had learned to 
move upon a stage, to dress up, wear shoes, and even said a few words.
From twelve until twenty, I performed in every garden.
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But, then, it was all undone.
And the animals returned to the woods to continue their silent life.]
Although it would appear that the “inhabitants of nearby houses” assume the 
role of addressees, of “listen[ers],” their presence, like Dickinson’s admiring 
“Bog,” is unnecessary for the representation to occur; the neighbors “spied.” 
Furthermore, the poem points to rudimentary or initial representational 
processes. The “show was improvised, right there,” the animals only “learned 
to . . . [say] a few words,” and upon the speaker’s transition to adulthood, “it 
was all undone.” In addition to being independent of communal reciprocity, 
here representation is not an accomplished or finite act, but a developmental 
process.
In di Giorgio’s poetry, this blissful encounter with nature, and any type of 
partial or full metamorphoses, is tied to the equally pleasurable acquisition 
of language. In poem “21” from the 1971 book, Está en llamas el jardín natal 
[The Garden of My Birth Is on Fire], the complete metamorphosis of the speaker 
involves the “birth” of lilies and the incomplete transition from babble to speech.
De pronto, nacieron las azucenas:
en el aire oscuro de la noche, del atardecer, abrieron sus caras blancas, sus 
fosas blancas, ¿qué iba a hacer yo, con esa gente blanquísima?
Me ocurrían cosas extrañas, silabeaba, deletreaba como si sólo tu-viera 
dos o tres años, me parecía que veía, a lo lejos, flotar en el aire, a papá y a 
mamá, o que escuchaba conversaciones anticísimas [sic] en un idioma que sólo 
se conocía en la casa. Tal vez, me iba a morir. Me arrodillé, el cabello me cubrió 
el rostro; quise rezar y llorar. Pero, sólo me erguí, y con un paso de bailarín, de 
sonámbula, llegué hasta la casa; mamá proseguía su eterna labor, pasé al través 
de las habitaciones, volando, logré izarme sobre las arboledas; me había vuelto 
un ser extraño, un monstruo, con muchas alas, volaba, planeaba, mirando 
siempre hacia allá, hacia el lugar donde habían nacido las azucenas. (173) 
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[Suddenly, the lilies were born:
in the dark night air, at sunset, they opened their white faces, their white 
hollows. What would I do, with such white people? 
Strange things occurred to me, I syllabicated, spelled out as if I were only 
two or three years old, and it seemed that I could see, far away, floating in the 
air, mama and papa, or that I could hear antient conversations in a language 
that was only known at my house. Maybe, I was going to die. I kneeled down, 
hair covered my face; I wanted to pray and cry. But, I just stood up straight, 
and with a dancer’s or a sleepwalker’s step, I arrived to the house; mama went 
about her never-ending work, I passed through the rooms, flying, I managed 
to hoist myself up on the groves; I had become a strange being, a monster, 
with many wings, flying, gliding, always watching over there, over in the place 
where the lilies had been born.]
The lilies’ “white faces” incite the speaker to lose her human form as well 
as her voice, or the capacity to speak a fully developed language. Susan 
Stewart has considered the loss of voice as it relates to individuation in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses. She suggests that “[f]or these characters, losing a capacity for 
speech is yoked not just to the loss of their human form but also to the loss 
of the form of their persons or proper names—that name by which they are 
called or summoned into the reciprocity of living human speech” (61). Thus to 
be human, for Ovid, is to possess the human form but, more important, to be 
distinguishable from others through the proper name as we are “summoned 
into the reciprocity” of spoken language. However, for di Giorgio, to be human 
is to recall the sound processes that come before we are “summoned into the 
reciprocity” that is the decipherability of our proper names. 
The learning and loss of language here involves the memory of language 
itself through sounds that tie us as much to the animal and natural world as to 
our own physical stages of development. Daniel Heller-Roazen has explored the 
memory of linguistic sounds lost upon a child’s acquisition of language. Roman 
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Jakobson, he explains, learned that the repetitive vocalizations of infants, called 
echolalia, contained all possible human sounds. Heller-Roazen thus asks: “Do 
the languages of the adult retain anything of the infinitely varied babble from 
which they emerged? If they did, then it would be only an echo, since where 
there are languages, the infant’s prattle has long ago vanished, at least in the 
form it once had in the mouth of the child who could not yet speak. It would 
be only an echo, of another speech and of something other than speech: 
an echolalia, which guarded the memory of the indistinct and immemorial 
babble that, in being lost, allowed all languages to be” (“The Apex” 11–12). 
When an infant enters into the formality of a common language, the majority 
of those echolalic sounds are lost except, Heller-Roazen later suggests, within 
poetic form as, for example, echoes of syllabic count (“Persian” 195–202). Di 
Giorgio’s poetry, always nostalgic, attempts to recuperate the idea of those 
possibilities at the moments before they’re dissolved in the centripetal pull of 
that communal language. In this sense, words, for di Giorgio, are embedded 
with the loss of what allowed them to be. But this loss, as both di Giorgio and 
Heller-Roazen suggest, might be recuperated—or at least remembered as a 
future possibility—through sounds as they are accessed in poetic form. 
What could be more pleasurable than the echolalia of a child? But who is 
more in need of the communal than that child as she is completely dependent 
on her family or other adults who surround her? Although di Giorgio interrupts 
the call for reciprocity within a common language, in poem “21” (“Suddenly, 
the lilies”), to syllabicate or spell out like an infant learning to speak involves 
the memory of a language that is proper to the speaker’s family. It is as if those 
particular sounds recall what is genetically embedded, or known differently, 
among familial relations. But the poem identifies syllabication as well as the 
“conversaciones anticísimas” or “antient conversations,” like a familial idiolect. 
“[A]nticísimas,” an incorrect spelling of “antiquísimas,” refers to the word’s 
dual meaning through an etymological reference: “antiguo” comes from 
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the Latin “anticus,” temporally “before” or “former.” The word also refers to 
“ante,” as in physically “before” or “in front of.” “[A]nticísimos” speaks to the 
familial relations of words, to language here among us like family members 
whose genetically present ancestors are nonetheless inaccessible to us. Again, 
this is Barthes’ sense of loss within the text of bliss that, for di Giorgio, is the 
condition of language. But what the connection between an echolalic state 
and familial relations stresses is an absolute dependency—that of the child—
as the foundation of our humanity. Solitude is the memory of this relationship 
within language. Furthermore, for di Giorgio, the poetic voice that loses the 
capacity for speech and metamorphoses into a flying “monster,” is actually 
becoming more human. 
Thus, the poet’s interruption of communal consent unsettles Locke’s sense 
of contingent and reciprocal communal bonds to replace them with a notion 
of the familial community. What makes di Giorgio’s community familial, that 
is genetically or etymologically connected, however, is how that family is 
retrieved through sounds and common longing. Here is poem “23” of Está en 
llamas el jardín natal:
Oh, volver a la propiedad familiar, a la tarde cruzar el campo donde la hortensia 
levanta su cara de humo, de pluma, su cabeza murmurante, su sombrero de 
vidrio, de turquesas, donde nace la honga feroz, la seta de venenosa espuma, 
cruzar los campos durmiendo, con los ojos bien abiertos, bien cerrados, sin 
equivocarse nunca, sin caer sobre las zarzas, las fogatas, los otros seres que 
van por el campo soñando, hasta aquella ciudadela siempre visible y perdida, 
entrar en ella, cenar, pecar furiosamente.
Años sin fecha, cerrados como pastos, la neblina. (174) 
[Oh, to return to the familial property, in the afternoon cross the field where 
the hydrangea lifts her smoky face, of plume, her murmuring head, her hat 
made of glass, of turquoises, where the ferocious fungus, the venomous froth 
mushroom, traverse the countryside asleep, with eyes wide open, sealed shut, 
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without ever making a mistake, without stumbling on the briars, the bonfires, 
or other beings that wander through the countryside dreaming, to that always 
visible and lost citadel, go in there, dine, and sin furiously.
Years without date, closed like pastures, the fog.]
The speaker, again, longs to go back to what is always present, like the 
discovery of a language that is already known or the “antient conversations.” 
This going back is accessed through the unconscious dreaming mind whose 
eyes are “wide open” yet “sealed shut.” But once the focus of the poem, the 
“always visible and lost citadel,” like the already known language, is reached, 
the poem is overcome by a sense of loss. Furthermore, the presence of “other 
beings,” also dreaming and wandering, emphasizes a common search for what 
is ultimately also “familiar,” that is, intimately and singularly known, yet “lost” 
to all. While other poems establish the speaker’s relationship to the “consent 
of language,” which involves a necessary distance from governmental, 
juridical, or pedagogically ordering principles, here is the idea of a governing 
community. Di Giorgio’s “citadel,” like echolalia, is one of sounds that allowed 
all languages to be. We access this “citadel” through the bliss of poetry, the 
genre that remembers the learning of language, the moment at which all 
languages and meanings were possible. And to return to such a place would 
be to “sin furiously” against a “world…described consensually.” It would be 
to achieve a crisis in one’s relationship to language and reject the most basic 
structures through which communal consent is imposed. But what is most 
radical about di Giorgio’s “citadel” is that it is a place in which individuals, like 
small children, are completely reliant upon those around them. This reliance is 
expressed through sound and, in this poem, the senses.
Dickinson’s and di Giorgio’s ideas of solitude are definitions of what it 
means to be human among others. However, while for Dickinson, solitude 
is a state that does not involve nostalgia for the past or longing to congeal 
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with others into the future, for di Giorgio, it is language’s painful ever-present 
memory of togetherness. Such togetherness, ironically, is the moment 
we are fully vulnerable upon others as in a childlike state, which demands 
even more interconnectedness than Locke’s sense of the communal in that 
the latter would imply consent, something a child cannot achieve. Sounds 
signify our dependency upon others before the terms of that dependency 
are circumscribed by our actual ability to speak it. Solitude is what di Giorgio 
believes to be our embedded memory of the “citadel,” of that intimate and 
precarious interconnectedness before our coming into languages which sets 
more rigid (although, perhaps equally precarious) terms of participation 
in motion. And if there is a place to relieve this solitude, or at least, to 
acknowledge it, it is in the lost citadel of poetic form.
Notes
This article first appeared in Spanish as “Soledad y el consentir del lenguaje: Marosa di Giorgio 
y Emily Dickinson” Revista de la Biblioteca Nacional de Uruguay, vol. 13, 2017, pp. 125-45. The 
author and editors wish to thank the original publishers for the permission to publish this 
translated version.
1 This and all translations of poetry and secondary sources are my own.
2 “No hay narratividad sino un intenso lirismo ya que todo está al servicio de la 
expression de la subjetividad del yo. Al mismo tiempo, la recreación poética 
elabora una visión, un mundo interior en el que, por añadidura, quedan abolidas 
todas las categorías y convenciones desde que da forma a confuses perturbaciones 
del inconsciente sin propósito edificante ni paradigmático.” (Pallares 44).
3 “Los poemas y relatos de Marosa di Giorgio empujan de inmediato, evadiendo 
preámbulos y túneles—a lo Lewis Carroll en el descenso de Alicia—, ya que 
carecen de gestos o pactos tranquilizantes con los lectores, tales como los de 
espacio mitico, o alegoría, o categorías de lo fantástico.” (Pezzolano 54).
4 “En el universo de Los Papeles Salvajes… nada es imposible. Allí, el trasiego entre 
lo imaginario y lo cotidiano se comporta de manera aviesa, sin parámetros 
morales de ningún tipo…” (Bravo 259). 
5 Di Giorgio wrote a short essay on Emily Brontë and Emily Dickinson called “Emily 
y Emily” that was published in the December 1995 issue of Posdata. She describes 
•   Deeny
254 Periphe–rica   •   A Journal of Social, Cultural, and Literary History
Dickinson as follows: “En su adolescencia acaso brilló fugazmente en las reuniones 
sociales del pueblo. Luego, se volcó de modo definitivo, sobre sí misma, y al 
interior de su caserón.” (159) (“During her adolescence perhaps she shined briefly 
in the towns’ social gatherings. Then, she turned definitively, upon herself, to the 
interior spaces of her family home.”) 
6 For a comparative study of the extent to which Locke’s theories informed political 
philosophy in the US and Latin America, see Chiaramonte.
7 At the same time Locke cannot ignore the fact that to unleash meaning to 
consensual collective usage is to open a Pandora’s box of what he feared would be 
incorrect usage. Throughout Book III of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(1689) is a desire to fix language, moderate and establish the bounds of meaning, 
make words count mathematically in such a way that they, as precisely as 
possible, match particular yet commonly recognized and understood ideas. In the 
Book’s first chapter that addresses the “abuse of words,” such “abuses” include 
“words without any, or without clear ideas,” “inconsistency,” “obscurity,” “empty 
speculations,” “taking a word for the thing,” and even “figurative speech.” Again, 
because speech, Locke concludes, is “the great bond that holds society together, 
and the common conduit, whereby the improvement of knowledge are conveyed 
from one man, and one generation to another” we must “consider what remedies 
are to be found for these inconveniences above-mentioned.” (III, x–xi: 208–215).
8 As Hans Aarsleff has pointed out, “[i]nstead of securing that language kept its 
place as the docile servant of thought, [Locke]… gave so much power to words 
that they were poised to become the very agency of mental life… It became the 
central doctrine of this new conception that language (as speech) has a human 
origin and that both its creation and its continued use are primal expressions 
of our humanity.” See “Locke’s Influence,” 271. Aarsleff here refers to Book IV, 
Chapter vi, § 1 of the Essay. 
9 For a consideration of Locke’s influence on modern concepts of “identity” and 
time, see Taylor.
10 During the first four years of the dictatorship, Uruguay had the highest per 
capita of political detainees in the world. Overall, more than 60,000 people were 
imprisoned in this country. See Lessa and Druliolle; Pearce; Sondrol 196; Weinstein.
11 For a consideration of the dictatorship’s impact on cultural fields in Uruguay see 
Sosnowski and Popkin; Rey Tristán; Moraña.
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